CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study
It is a fact that teachelrs make a difference. Everyone – students, parents, teachers, principals and even casual observers – have always known this. But how much of a difference teachers make has only recently been estimated. Teachers are arguably the most important school factor affecting students’ achievement (Hanushek, 2002). We know it is possible for teachers to make large differences in student learning. Policies and Rractices affecting where and how teachers work must. then reflect the importance of teachers in the educational process. The task is to develop policies that increase the number and equitable distribution of teachers who promote learning at high rates. Some reformers focus on improving skills through better training, both pre-service and in-service (Hill, “2007); others focus on teacher recruitment strategies (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff and Wyckoff, 2007). But the reform that needs to be given most attention at the local, state, and national levels, is giving teachers’ performance incentives. There are two theories of action that under-gird this approach. One is that incentives matter and teachers would produce greater student learning (or at least put greater effort into producing student learning) ifthere were incentives or rewards for doing so. The second is that because current compensation or remuneration policies generally do not significantly differentiate among teachers based on characteristics other than longevity of service and courses taken, introducing compensation-based ways of recognizing and rewarding performance could make teaching a more attractive career option. Both approaches also assume that rewarding perfoffi1ance might also put to better use the funds that are incuned now in the traditional compensation system, by which teachers were rewarded for characteristics (such as certification and experience) that are at best weakly related to teacher effectiveness (Obadara, 2012) ..
Teacher incentive programmes are policies that explicitly link teacher’s compensation to their students’ perfomlance. Until the 1990s, such programmes were qui te rare, b~lt in the last 15 years they have become much more common, mostly in the United States. In the United States, examples include programmes in Rhode Island (beginning in 19.99), Denver (beginning in 1999-2000), and Douglas County, Colorado (1994) (Olsen, 1999; Education Commission of the States, 2000). They typically offer annual merit pay that amounts to from 10% to 40% of an average teacher’s monthly salary (American Federation of Teachers, 2000). Teacher incentive programmes have also been initiated in other countries. Two examples are Israel, which provides incentives to teachers based on students’ scores (Lavy, 2002), and a World Bank-fundcd programme in Mexico that provides performance inccnti ves to primary school teachers. Advocates of teacher incc:ntive programmes poinf out that teachers currently face weak incentives, with pay deter~ined almost entirely by educational attainment, training, and experience, rather than performance (Harbison and Hanushek, 2002; Hanushek, Kain & Steven, 1998; Hanushek, 1996; Lockheed and Verspoor, 20 11). They claim that linking teachers’ pay to students’ performance will increase teachers’ efforts. Opponents respond that, since teachers’ tasks are multi-dimensional and tests can measure only some dimensions of learning, linking compensation to test scores gives teachers an . . incentive to sacrifice promoting curiosity and creative thinking in pursuit of skills that are tested on standardized exams (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 2010; Hannaway, 2012).
But the fact is that in many developing ‘coLmtries like Nigeria, incentives for teachers are usually very weak. Parts of the evidences for this are high rates of teacher absenteeism and high turnover rate in the profession. Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremmer, Muralidharan, & Roger (2006) show that primary school teachers were absent from school 27% of the time in Uganda, 25% in India, 14% in Ecuador and 11% in Peru. Glcwwe, Bias and Kremer (2003) reveal a teacher absenteeism rate of 20% in rural primary schools in Kenya. Ev~n when Kenyan teachers are at the school they are otten not in the classroom; classroom observation data show a teacher absenteeism rate of27%. The data in Nigeria reveal 21% teacher absenteeism in rural secondary schools and 28% turnover rate in Nigerian secondary schools (Jacobson, 2005). Given this situation, advocates for teacher incentives seem to have a stronger case in developing countries like ours than in developed countries, that IS, an environment with very weak incentives. This study therefore examines the effect of incentive package on the performance of secondary school teachers.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Over the years, most of the teachers’ grievances have always resulted from non-institution of functional and effective incentive schemes in the school system. More often than not, results in observed deviant attitude of teachers towards school work as shown in the high rate of absenteeism, non-commitment to effective teaching of students. It is very rare for teachers especially in the public schools to cover the schedule of work of their teaching subject. Slow learners no longer receive personalized teaching (extra attention) except payment is made privately, to teacher. The extra lesson syndrome for extra pay is a common feature in both public and private schools. All these problems gave rise to poor performance, low morale, restiveness and deviant behaviour by both the teacher and the students. The poor performance of students in examinations like (SSCE, NECO and JAMB) and the decaying standard of education in our society is even becoming more problematic than ever, due to the inculcation of bribery and corruption and other malpractices in our school system. Based on the foregoing, this study is structured to determine the relationship between incentive scheme and job performance of secondary school teachers in Lagos Metropolis
1.3 Objective of the Study
The main objective of this study is to find out the effect of incentive package on the performance of secondary school teachers in Lagos state, specifically the study intends to:
1. Find out the relationships between work incentives and class attendance by teachers in secondary schools
2. Find out the relationships between work incentives and teachers’ coverage of scheme of work
3. Analyze the effect of incentive package and performance of teachers
4. Examine the challenges teachers encounter in getting their incentive package
1.4 Research Question
1. Is there any relationships between work incentives and class attendance by teachers in secondary schools?
2. Is there any relationships between work incentives and teachers’ coverage of scheme of work?
3. What is the effect of incentive package and performance of teachers?
4. What challenges does teachers encounter in getting their incentive package?
1.5 Research Hypothesis
Ho: there is no significant effect of incentive package and performance of teachers
Hi: there is significant effect of incentive package and performance of teachers
1.6 Significance of the Study
The study bears great importance to the school management bodies of secondary schools to realize the vitality of establishing sound reward and incentive system in their school so as to enhance effective teacher performance for realization of good results for their students. The study is also significant to the Head teachers and Parent Teachers Committee, to know the best way to motivate their teachers thus enhancing teacher performance. The findings of this study will also help employers (Ministry of Education) and policy makers to come up with informed policies or decisions on how reward system should be awarded.
Lastly this research will serve as a guide and reference point for other research on incentives and teacher performance.
1.7 Scope of the Study
The research examines the effectiveness of school incentives package on the performance of teachers in Secondary Schools in Lagos state, public secondary schools in Oshodi/Isolo LGA will be used for this research work.
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