The Role Of U.S. In World Affairs After Sept 911 A Case Study Of African Politics
TABLE OF CONTENT
1.1 Background to the Study
Statement of Problem
The Process of Securitization
UNITED STATES’ SECURITY GOVERNANCE AND AFRICA: A CASE OF NIGERIA
Implications on Counterterrorism
THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN WORLD AFFAIRS
Evaluation of the 9/11 and the core executive
Making claims about Africa: the executive as securitizing actor
The United States’ National Interest in Nigeria and Africa
African sub region
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In the wake of 9/11, Africa was securitized in a new way by the United States (US): weak states were believed to pose an existential threat to the US. American aid to Africa consequently more than tripled in the years following 9/11. But why did decade-long US security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria fail to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread? There is little agreement among scholars on the impact and implications of US security engagements in Nigeria on the military’s counterterrorism strategies. The study was an attempt aimed at understanding the role of the United States if America in world affairs after 9/11; with a focus on African politics. Using a qualitative approach, the study discovered that the United States national interests remain largely unchanged and its averred condemnation of foreign terrorism incontestable, and therefore, play a very vital role in African politics and global affairs.
1.1 Background to the Study
It is a historical fact that human society has always been shaped by violence in various forms. In traditional societies, violence included raids, tribal wars, slavery and rebellion. These were carried out as individuals and groups sought to improve their power, status and influence over others, or to register their grievances. The insurrection has existed throughout history, but it has decreased in strategic importance. Today, the world has entered another time when rebellion is common and has strategic importance.
The uprising is a strategy used by groups that cannot achieve their political goals with conventional power takeovers. The uprising is characterized by persistent violence, asymmetry, ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban areas), psychological warfare and political mobilization that protect the insurgents and ultimately affect the balance of power in your favor. Insurgents may try to gain power and replace the existing government (revolutionary uprising), or they may have more limited goals such as separation, independence, or change in a particular policy. They avoid battlefields where they are weakest and focus on the areas where they can operate on equal footing. They try to postpone resolute action, to avoid defeat, to assert themselves, to expand their support and hope that the balance of power will change in their favor over time (Metz, 2004: 2).
In general, there are two types of uprisings. The first is what may be called a “national” uprising. The main opponents are the insurgents and a functioning government, which has a certain amount of legitimacy and support among the people. The differences between insurgents and government are based on economic class, ideology, identity (ethnicity, race, religion) or other political factor. The government may have external supporters, but the conflict is clearly between the insurgents and a national government. The national uprisings are triangular because they involve not only the two antagonists, the insurgents and the insurgents, but also a multitude of other actors who can change the relationship between one or the other supporting antagonist. The most important of these other actors is the population of the country, but it can also involve states, organizations and external groups. Insurgents and insurgents pursue strategies that somehow reflect the image of others as they try to weaken the other party, while at the same time attracting the neutrals or those who are not committed to one side or the other (Metz, 2004: 2). ).
The second important type is the uprising “liberation”. These place the insurgents against a ruling group that considers themselves external residents because of their race, ethnicity or culture. The goal of the insurgents is to “liberate” their nation from the foreign occupation. Examples include the uprising in Rhodesia, the white minority government in South Africa, the Palestinian uprising, Vietnam after 1965, the Afghan uprising against the Soviet occupation, Chechnya, the current uprising of the Taliban / Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the uprising. of Iraq (Metz, 2004: 3).
Insurgent movements have always been part of human history. Insurgent forces have been a constant factor in the history of the war, from the nomadic rebels who ousted the Roman Empire to the Internet jihadists who exploded the plane and unleashed the misunderstood “global war on terror” in the United States. And fighting them has become more difficult than ever. According to Max Boot, “Invisible Armies” is a narrative about guerrilla warfare and insurrection, from its origins to the fall of the Akkadian Empire in Mesopotamia in the 22nd century BC. Chr. To the present is enough (Boot, 2013).
Among the many “liberal” insurgents that Boat (2013) is considering is the American Revolution; The fight against Napoleon in the Iberian Peninsula. The war of Greece for independence against the Ottomans; The unification wars in Italy and several rebellions against the colonial powers, such as the slave revolt against the French, which led to the founding of the Republic of Haiti. In the twentieth century, Boot observed the effects of irregular forces in World Wars 1 and 2, contributing to insurrection The contribution to the insurrectional theory of Mao Tse Tung’s seminal work “In the War of the Guerrillas”, from whose experiences in the Chinese civil war the most diverse won
The French and British reactions to rebellions against their waning empires, the “chic chic” revolutionaries of the 1960s, and the rise of radical Islamism (Boot, 2013).
With insurgents putting the weak against the strong, history shows that most of them are failing (Boot, 2013). Between 1775 and 1945, only a quarter achieved most or all of its goals. However, according to the boat (2013), this number has increased to 40% since 1945. One reason for improving the success rate is the growing importance of public opinion. Since 1945, the development of democracy, education, the media and the concept of international law has worsened in order to undermine the will of the states that are committed to prolonged counterinsurgency. In the fight for the story, the insurgents have much more weapons at their disposal than before (Boot, 2013). As a result, regular armies from the American Revolution to World War II, Syria, and Afghanistan are facing irregular combatants who are hiding among the population and targeting their targets.
In many African countries there is widespread dissatisfaction and disillusionment between different communities, because successive governments are unable to resolve complaints that are due to a lack of response from the state and insensitivity to the difficult situation of the EU population for long periods of time. This creates despair and frustration that certain leaders use to organize defiant attacks or incipient anarchy. Terrorist acts committed by insurgent groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabab, the Islamic Salvation Front, the Niger Deltas Movement (MEND) and the Boko Haram Crisis witnessed clear examples.
Statement of Problem
After 11 September 2001, the United States’ African security agenda changed. Africa became important because weak states were claimed to be a danger to America’s security. Unable to provide for the basic needs of their people and lacking full control of their borders, weak states in Africa provided both a breeding ground and safe haven for terrorist organizations. Who initiated the post-9/11 change in US Africa policy? Why and how did they do so? Who legitimated the claim and why? How has the US securitization agenda affected African politics? What role does the United States play in global affairs and international counter-terrorism? This study seeks to address these questions with the help of the securitization theory on account of its analysis of security agenda-setting.
This study investigates who initiated the post-9/11 change in US Africa policy and foreign affairs, why and how they did so, and who legitimated the claims. Taken together, these answers help explain why post 9/11 changes in US Africa policy and global affairs took place.
The format of the study is akin to a theoretical case study, with the intent to advance theory and to illustrate a case, and in the belief that the securitization theory is well suited to the case at hand. Although the method is implicitly comparative, the study is unable to investigate alternative or competing explanations of the post-911 securitization of Africa by the US. Also, the researcher was unable to investigate whether the US after 911 securitized other parts of the world in a manner similar to Africa. The study makes use of a wide range of evidence to support the arguments. The study draws on academic articles and books, reports and Internet sources. Primary sources are however most important, specifically official documents, figures and media statements, for the simple reason that we seek an answer to changes in official US policy and role in the global affairs.
GET THE COMPLETE PROJECT MATERIAL (FILE)S NOW!>>
Do you need help? Talk to us right now: (+234) 08060082010, 08107932631, 08157509410 (Call/WhatsApp). Email: email@example.com